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*Fiend - Cur. Sta. of Prog.*  
**DRAFT**

*4 January 1950*  
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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Possible Alternatives For Implementing Operational Phases of BGFIEND

1. A previous paper has recommended the establishment of an overt holding area in the U. S. Zone of Germany as a requisite first step in the conduct of further operational reconnaissance of Albania. The purpose of this paper is to examine the various possibilities for effecting withdrawals of agents from this camp, for training such agents and for infiltrating such agents into Albania.

2. On the premise that BGFIEND will continue to be a joint US/UK operation and will not involve third services as equal partners, our planning to date has envisaged the establishment of safe houses in the US and UK Zones of Germany and/or Austria for training small increments of Albanian <sup>operatives</sup> agents. The subsequent infiltration of these agents has been based upon the concept of moving these agents by air or surface transport to Klagenfurt, from which point they would be flown in unmarked aircraft to the target area, the aircraft subsequently returning to Klagenfurt or continuing on to the RAF controlled portion of the Athens airport. An alternative dispatching method is the transport of these agents from training area to Malta by air and their subsequent introduction into the target area by sea.

3. Should the French Service be cut in as an equal partner, it has been proposed to request utilization of French North African

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territory for clandestine training. In this connection the clandestine removal of selected agents from the German holding area and their transport to North Africa is considered practicable. As to the mounting of the reconnaissance from French North African territory, the following are possibilities:

a. Direct air transport from the Cape Bon area of Tunisia. While this has not been examined in detail either from the standpoint of availability of dispatching base or overall distance to target area, it is estimated that it would be impracticable for C-47 aircraft, even with extra fuel tanks, to effect the drop and return to base of origin. This immediately raises the problem of providing a second airfield secured for the reception of unmarked aircraft.

b. The movement of trainees to Malta for subsequent introduction by sea. Should this be decided upon there would appear to be no advantage of bringing in ~~a third~~ <sup>the French</sup> service, other than that of increasing the complexity of the problem to be unraveled by hostile intelligence agencies, since under the proposal advanced in paragraph 2 the agents could be moved directly to Malta from training areas in Germany.

c. The movement of agents to, and their infiltration from, Italy or Greece with the connivance and assistance of the appropriate service. This is practicable only if the American Service "freezes out" the British on this

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aspect of the operation and arranges all the required details directly with the Italian or Greek Services. In this instance again the remarks contained in sub-paragraph b above, as regards the advisability of French participation, apply with equal weight, *except for the doubt on the advisability of direct collaboration with the French.*

4. Another possibility which suggests itself is the clandestine removal of Albanian agents from Germany and their transport <sup>direct</sup> to Italy or Greece for infiltration into the target area with the assistance of the Greek or Italian Services. As indicated in paragraph 3-c above, this is an <sup>eminently</sup> ~~imminently~~ practical solution provided that the British are shut out completely from any dealings with the Greek or Italian Services in the premises and that all arrangements are made by OSO and OPC in combination. <sup>However</sup> ~~In this connection~~, it is not considered feasible to <sup>justify</sup> ~~lay on~~ a unilateral approach to either the Italians or Greeks under any concept which would <sup>also</sup> envisage the holding and/or training phases being conducted in conjunction with either the Greek or Italian Services. *OSO may*

5. ~~Finally~~ if US proceeds unilaterally, etc. = directly with OSO & Italians or Greeks if political considerations can be met. ~~as envisaged~~

RGS/dr  
4 Jan 50

*Final Alternative*

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